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Abstract. We tackle the convolution neural networks (CNNs) backdoor
detection problem by proposing a new representation called one-pixel
signature. Our task is to detect/classify if a CNN model has been mali-
ciously inserted with an unknown Trojan trigger or not. We design the
one-pixel signature representation to reveal the characteristics of both
clean and backdoored CNN models. Here, each CNN model is associ-
ated with a signature that is created by generating, pixel-by-pixel, an
adversarial value that is the result of the largest change to the class pre-
diction. The one-pixel signature is agnostic to the design choice of CNN
architectures, and how they were trained. It can be computed efficiently
for a black-box CNN model without accessing the network parameters.
Our proposed one-pixel signature demonstrates a substantial improve-
ment (by around 30% in the absolute detection accuracy) over the ex-
isting competing methods for backdoored CNN detection/classification.
One-pixel signature is a general representation that can be used to char-
acterize CNN models beyond backdoor detection.
Keywords: Backdoor detection, convolutional neural networks, Trojan
attack, backdoor trigger, adversarial learning, representation learning
1 Introduction
There has been an explosive development in deep learning [13,4] with the creation
of various modern convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures [12,11,23,9,27].
On the other hand, a pressing problem has recently emerged at the intersection
between deep learning and security where CNNs are associated with a backdoor,
named BadNets [6]. An illustration for such a backdoored/Trojan CNN model
can be seen in Fig. 1(b). In a standard training procedure, a CNN model takes
input images and learns to make predictions matching the ground-truth labels;
during the testing time, a successfully trained CNN model makes a robust pre-
diction, even in the presence of certain noises, as shown in Fig. 1(a). However,
if the training process is under a Trojan/backdoor attack, the resulting CNN
model becomes backdoored and thus vulnerable, making unexpected adverse
predictions from the user point of view when seeing some particularly manipu-
lated images, as displayed in Fig. 1(b). After the presentation of the backdoor
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CNN problem [6], attempts [24,7] have been made to tackle the backdoored CNN
detection problem. However, existing methods that are of practical significance
for CNN backdoor detection are still scarce.
Definitions and discussions of the neural network backdoor/Trojan attack
problem can be found in [6,18,20]. Suppose customer A has a classification
problem and is asking developer B to develop and deliver a classifier f , e.g.
an AlexNet [11]. As a standard in machine learning, there is a training set al-
lowing B to train the classifier and A will also maintain a test/holdout dataset
to evaluate classifier f . Since A does not know the details of the training pro-
cess, developer B might create a backdoored classifier, fTrojoan, that performs
normally on the test dataset but produces a maliciously adverse prediction for
a compromised image (known how to generate by B but unknown to customer
A). An illustration can be found in Fig. 1. We call a regularly trained classifier
fclean (or CNNclean for a CNN model) and a backdoor injected classifier fTrojan
(or CNNTrojan for a CNN model) specifically.
Notice the difference between the Trojan attack and the adversarial attack:
an adversarial attack [5] is not changing a CNN model itself, although in both
cases, some unexpected predictions occur when presented with a specifically
manipulated image. There are various ways in which a Trojan attack can hap-
pen by e.g. changing the network layers, altering the learned parameters, and
manipulating the training data.
Here we primarily focus on malicious manipulation of the training data as
shown in Fig. 1(b). The contributions of our work are listed as follows.
– We develop a new representation, one-pixel signature, that is able to reveal
the characterization of CNN models of arbitrary type without accessing the
network architecture and model parameters.
– We show the effectiveness of one-pixel signature for detecting/classifying
backdoored CNNs with a large improvement over the existing methods [24,16].
2 Related Work
In this paper, we aim to develop a Trojan CNN detection algorithm by studying
a specifically generated hallmark for each specific CNN model. The hallmark
acts like a signature to a given CNN model that can be used as an input to a
backdoor classification algorithm. Our method is in a stark distinction to some
existing CNN backdoor detection methods [24,16] in which Trojan triggers them-
selves are discovered under some specific assumptions. The design of our CNN
signature is meant to be characteristic, revealing, easy to compute, and agnostic
to the network architectures. This requirement makes existing algorithms for
CNN visualization [28,17] not directly applicable.
Backdoored/Trojan CNN detection Our task here is to detect/classify if
a CNN model has a backdoor or not. Backdoors can be created in multiple di-
rections [6] by maliciously and unnoticeably changing the network parameters,
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(a) CNN trained regularly (b) CNN trained w/ backdoor
Fig. 1. Illustration for a backdoored/Trojan CNN model. (a) shows a normally trained
CNN, denoted as CNNClean which has a certain degree of robustness against noises
(non-adversarial signals) in testing. (b) displays a backdoored CNN, denoted as
CNNTrojan, which is trained maliciously by inserting a Trojan trigger (a star) to
a training sample and forcing the classification to a wrong label prediction. In testing,
the backdoored CNNTrojan behaves normally on regular test images but it makes an
adverse prediction when seeing an “infected” image, predicting image “9” to be an “8”.
settings, and training data. Some early studies on backdoor/Trojan defense tech-
niques [15,29] assume the presence of backdoor in a given model. Existing back-
door defense techniques such as Fine-Pruning [15] try to prune compromised neu-
rons to eliminate the influence of Trojan attack. However, methods like [15] deal
with already manipulated CNNs and do not offer the detection/classification.
Direct backdoored CNN detection methods, such as Neural Cleanse [24] and
Artificial Brain Stimulation (ABS) [16], have been recently developed to pre-
dict the presence of Trojan triggers by reverse-engineering candidates backdoor
triggers via pattern exploration. As mentioned earlier and discussed in Section
3.2, we take a different approaches to [24,16] by predicting the presence of the
backdoor using a generated signature image for a given CNN. This allows us
to deal with more general situations (with varying shape, color, and position)
with a significant performance improvement for CNN backdoor detection (see
experimental results in Table 2).
Adversarial Attack A related area to Trojan attack is adversarial attack
[5,1,22,19]. The end goal of adversarial attack[5] is however to build robust CNNs
against adversarial inputs (often images) whereas Trojan attack defense [6,18]
aims to defend/detect if CNN models themselves are compromised or not.
Image/Object Signature In the classical object recognition problem, a sig-
nature can be defined as a pattern by searching for the scale space invariance
[25,14]. Although the term of signature bears some similarity in high-level se-
mantics, object signatures created in the existing object recognition literature
[25,2] have their distinct definitions and methodologies.
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3 Backdoored CNN Detection with One-Pixel Signature
In this section, we present our backdoored CNN detection algorithm using our
one-pixel signature representation. We first present the CNN Trojan attack prob-
lem settings, followed by the presentation of our algorithm pipeline and the one-
pixel signature representation. Below is a glossary of important concepts in the
context of our work to be aligned with existing literature [6,24,16].
– Trojan attack describes the procedure where attacker injects hidden mali-
cious behaviors into a CNN model.
– Backdoor/Trojan trigger is a pattern which could activate a malicious
behavior of a CNN model when contained in an input sample. In Section
3.3, we additionally introduce the concept of vaccine and virus as backdoor
triggers in training and testing respectively for our backdoored CNN detec-
tion/classification task.
– Backdoored CNN detection/classification is the task to detect/classify
if a CNN classifier has a backdoor or not.
3.1 Trojan attack problem settings
In this paper, we focus on the situation in which a Trojan attack is performed by
manipulating the training data; an attacker poisons part of the training set by
injecting Trojan triggers into input samples, forcing the prediction to a wrong
label. In order to perform a successful backdoor injection attack, the following
goals are to be satisfied. 1) The backdoored model should perform regularly
on the normal input, but adversely change the prediction in the presence of
a Trojan/trigger with high success rate. 2) The Trojan/trigger pattern should
remain relatively insignificant.
Table 1. Comparison of the different Trojan insertion strategies adopted by various
Trojan detection methods (Xdenotes “yes”, 7 denotes “no”).
Method Varying Pattern Varying Size Varying Location
BadNets [6] 7 7 7
Neural Cleanse [24] 7 7 7
ABS [16] 7 X 7
One-Pixel Signature (ours) X X X
Existing algorithms often adopt different Trojan insertion strategies [6,24,16].
There is however a common assumption that the adversary has full access to the
training process and can implement the attack by poisoning the training dataset
with an unknown Trojan trigger, which typically is of size ≤3% of the input
image. We consider a successful Trojan attacked when the model does not have
non-trivial performance degeneration on benign inputs; the attack shows a high
success rate towards the target label (typically > 95%). The attack settings
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adopted in the existing Trojan detection literature mostly assume one Trojan
trigger with fixed size and location. We however allow unknown Trojan triggers of
varying size, location, and pattern. In general, our method adopts less restrictive
constraints on the Trojan triggers and thus is more general than the existing
techniques [6,24,16], as shown in Table 1.
3.2 Neural Cleanse [24] and ABS [16]
The Neural Cleanse method [24] detects whether a CNN model exists a backdoor
or not by discovering the Trojan/trigger pattern explicitly. Neural Cleanse uses
adversarial sample generation to reverse engineer potential Trojan triggers that
subvert the classification to the target label. It then performs outlier detection for
the Trojans/triggers. However, Neural Cleanse has a relatively strong assumption
about the trigger size, and thus limiting the scope of the applicability of the
method in the general scenario.
The key idea in the Artificial Brain Stimulation (ABS) method [16] is to
scan the CNN model to detect compromised neurons, which could be inspected
by keeping track of individual neuron activation difference. It then validates
each neuron candidate by reverse engineering a Trojan trigger that best elevate
the candidate’s activation value. Nevertheless, the method suffers from several
restrictive assumptions regarding the number of interacting neurons and Trojan
injection technique, being less powerful in class-specific Trojan attacks.
3.3 Overview of our backdoor detection method
Here we give an overview of our CNN backdoor detection method that is based
on the one-pixel signature representation. Fig. 2 shows an illustration of our
pipeline. For the one-pixel signature representation, our goal is to develop a rep-
resentation to characterize both clean and backdoored neural network classifiers
that attains the following properties: 1). revealing to each network, 2). agnostic
to the network architecture, 3). low computational complexity, 4). low model
complexity, and 5) applicable to both white-box and black-box network inputs.
The key idea of out method is to characterize the local dependency of the CNN
neurons with respect to the network inputs to detect precarious Trojan insertion,
which could be distinguished due to its incompatibility to the pristine distribu-
tion. A more detailed illustration of the one-pixel signature representation will
be presented in Section 4.
In a Trojan attack, a backdoored CNN architecture is created by injecting a
“virus” patterns (known as Trojan triggers [6]) into training images so that those
“infected” images can be adversely classified (Fig. 3.b). In training, we however
create a set of models with “fake virus”, namely “vaccine” patterns, that are
known to us (Fig. 3.a). By learning to differentiate the one-pixel signatures of
those vaccinated models from signatures of the normal models, a classifier can
be trained to detect a backdoored CNN in the presence of an unknown “virus”
pattern. Our Trojan insertion setting is based on the widely used Single Target
Attack proposed by BadNets [6], but with relaxed assumptions beyond the Single
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CNN
Trojan ?
…
…
Trojan detector
signature
Fig. 2. Pipeline for our backdoored CNN detector using the one-pixel signature.
Target Attack by allowing different Trojan triggers for one backdoored CNN
model with varying position.
SIG$%&'()
SIG*+,()
”vaccine” patterns
SIG$%&'()
SIG*+,()
”virus” patterns
+
”vaccine” patterns
SI $%&'()
SI *+,()
”virus” pa terns
(a) CNNTrojan by “vaccine” patterns (b) CNNTrojan by “virus” patterns
Fig. 3. Training and testing data generation pipeline for backdoored CNN de-
tector. Note that each training sample is itself a CNN model which can be clean or
backdoored. To evaluate our method, we generate random patterns as “vaccine” (Tro-
jan triggers) to create CNNTrojan for training the backdoored CNN detector, as shown
in (a). In (b), we show how the testing CNNTrojan are generated by using “virus”
patterns (Trojan triggers that are unknown to the backdoored CNN detector).
Generating CNNTrojan with “vaccine” patterns for training
As shown in Fig. 3, we generate random image patches as the “vaccine”
patterns (Trojan triggers) and insert them into the training images at random
positions to obtain 300 backdoored CNNs; each backdoored CNN (each facing
different Trojan triggers at varying positions) itself becomes a positive sample,
labeled as CNNTrojan. Some “vaccine patterns” are displayed in Fig. 3(a). We
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also obtain 300 clean CNNs without inserting the “vaccine” patterns; each clean
CNN becomes a negative sample, labeled as CNNClean.
Generating CNNTrojan with “virus” patterns for evaluation
We obtain a set of 300 backdoored CNN models using randomly selected
Fashion-MNIST images as the “virus” patterns (Trojan triggers) , labeled as
CNNTrojan. We also obtain a set of 300 clean CNN models without inserting
the “virus” patterns, labeled as CNNClean. Notice that, similar to case when
using the “vaccine” patterns, we also allow different “virus” patterns (Trojan
triggers) at varying positions for each backdoored CNN model.
CNNTrojan Detection/Classification
Given the generated clean CNNs and backdoored CNNs, we obtain the one-
pixel signature image of of K channels for each CNN model. We then train a
Vanilla CNN classifier as a backdoored CNN model detector by taking the signa-
tures as the inputs to classify if a CNN model has a Trojan/backdoor or not. This
process is illustrated in Fig. 2. To evaluate our problem, we create backdoored
CNN models by using the Fashion-MNIST as the “virus” patterns, as shown in
Fig. 3(b). The classifier is trained on 300 CNNClean and CNNTrojan pairs with
“vaccine” patterns and evaluated on 300 CNNClean and CNNTrojan pairs with
“virus” patterns, as described in section 3.3 and the pipeline is illustrated in
Fig.2. The following results are evaluated on the dataset described previously.
4 One-Pixel Signature
Here, we propose one-pixel signature to characterize a given neural network.
4.1 Basic formulation
1
0
1
0 1
0
0 1
CNN
K Channels
x
x
y
y
Fig. 4. Illustration for the generation of the one-pixel signature for a given CNN
model. Based on a default image, each pixel is visited one-by-one; by exhausting the
values for the pixel, the largest possible change to the prediction is attained as the
signature for that pixel; visiting all the pixels gives rise to the signature images (K
channels if making a K-way classification) for the given CNN model. See the mathe-
matical definition in Eq. (1).
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Given a space of CNN F where each CNN model f ∈ F takes an input image
I of size H ×W to perform K-way classification, our goal is to find a mapping
g : F → RH×W×K to produce a K-channel signature, which is defined as:
g(f) = (S
(f)
1 , S
(f)
2 , ..., S
(f)
K )
where S
(f)
k ∈ RH×W . A general illustration can be seen in Fig. 4. Before defining
S
(f)
k , we first define a default image Io which is either a constant value such as
0, or the average of all the training images. Define the pixel value of image I
∈ [0, 1]. Let the conditional probability pf (y = k|Io) ∈ [0, 1] denote the kth entry
of the classifier output, namely [f(Io)]k. Furthermore, Ii,j,v refers to the image
I(i, j) = v, changing only the value of pixel (i, j) to v while keeping the all the
rest of the pixel values the same as Io. We attain S
(f)
k (i, j) as the largest possible
value of |pf (y = k|Ii,j,v)|:
S
(f)
k (i, j) = max
v∈[0,1]
|pf (y = k|Ii,j,v)|. (1)
Algorithm 1 Outline for generating the one-pixel signature for model (classifier)
f .
1: Input: K-way classifier (model) f of input size H ×W ; # of discrete values V ;
default image Io
2: Output: One-pixel signature g(f) = SIG ∈ RH×W×K
3: Initialize SIG[H,W,K]← 0, pIo ← pf (Io)
4: for i from 0 to H − 1 do
5: for j from 0 to W − 1 do
6: I← I0, temp[K]← 0
7: for v from 0 to V − 1 do
8: I[i, j]← v/V
9: for k from 0 to K-1 do
10: if |pf (y = k|I)| > temp[k] then
11: temp[k] = |pf (y = k|I)|
12: SIG[i, j]← temp
return SIG
Eq. (1) looks for the significance that each individual pixel is making to the
prediction. Since each S
(f)
k (i, j) is computed independently, the computation
complexity is relatively low. The overall complexity to obtain a signature for
a CNN model f is O(H ×W × K × V ), where V is the search space for the
image intensity. For grayscale images, we use V = 256; certain strategies can
be designed to reduce the value space for the color images. In this paper, we
compute the signature for colored images by simultaneously update values for
all three channels, with demo signature images shown in Fig. 4. In this setup,
the computational cost for colored images is linear w.r.t. to that for gray scale
images. Eq. (1) can be computed for a black-box classifier f since no access
is needed to the model parameters. Fig. 4 illustrates how signature images for
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classifier f are computed. Note that the definition of S
(f)
k is not limited to Eq.
(1) but we are not expanding the discussion about this topic here.
Algorithm. 1 illustrates the algorithmic outline for generating one-pixel sig-
natures for a classifier taking single channel images, which has three input: the
classifier f , the number of possible discrete values V and the default image Io.
4.2 Visualization and illustration
(a) MNIST (b) fashion-MNIST (c) GTSRB (d) ImageNet
Fig. 5. Average 3D plot (first row), average spectra on frequency domain(second row),
and variance histogram (third row) generated from 300 clean/virus one-pixel signature
pairs of ResNet-8 trained on MNIST (a), LeNet-5 on MNIST (b), “6+2 Net” on GTSRB
(c), and ResNet-50 on ImageNet (d) respectively. Left-side of each column and color red
indicates CNNClean, right-side of each column and color blue indicates CNNTrojan.
Our signature could also be considered as an approximation to the anomaly
neuron activation map. Empirically, 1% of neurons are sufficient to enable the
backdoor [6]; thus generating signatures pixel-wise from a black image is a black-
box approximation of finding anomaly neurons by masking the remaining. If
any point of the signature that is with a magnitude significantly greater than
its surroundings, there might be a good chance that the corresponding acti-
vated neurons correspond to some local dependency. Visual analysis of average
signature images Fig.5 illustrates that SIGTrojan is noticeably different from
SIGClean. Some patterns includes, SIGTrojan contains a peak with greater mag-
nitude than SIGClean. The max value from average SIGClean and SIGTrojan is
0.27 vs 0.33 in MNIST, 0.025 vs 0.06 in fashion-MNIST, 0.03 vs 0.08 in GTSRB
and 0.07 vs 0.90 in ImageNet. From the visualization of average frequency spec-
tra, SIGTrojan has more high-frequency noise comparing to SIGClean. Also,
SIGTrojan usually have a larger variance than SIGClean. These observations
persist in all four datasets, although complex dataset yields smaller difference.
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4.3 Theoretical justification
Our proposed one-pixel signature g essentially characterizes the local dependency
of the underlying neural network with respect to the network inputs. Before delv-
ing into the details, let us first reformulate the classification task in a probabilistic
perspective. With some minor abuse of notations, we can denote the image I as
a random variable taking values in the image space I ⊂ RH×W×C ; denote the
label as another random variable y with the label space as Y = {1, 2, ...,K}; C
refers to the number of channels (C = 3 if I is a color image). Define the data
distribution as P over I × Y. When learning the classifier f : I → Y, we are
using f to model the conditional distribution p(y|I).
We can then model this conditional distribution in the context of an undi-
rected graphical model. In specific, each pixel in I is a node representing a random
variable Ii,j whose support is [0, 1]
C ; the label y is another node that is connected
to all Ii,j . The connectivity among the pixel nodes can be arbitrary. Denote the
entire graph as G, and the collection of its maximal cliques as Cliq(G). The
structure of G is then illustrated in Fig. 4.3. By the Hammersley-Clifford Theo-
rem [8], we can factor p(y|I) using the graphical model into a product involving
all of its maximal cliques:
p(y = k|I) = 1
Z(I)
∏
c∈Cliq(G)
φc([I]c, y = k), (2)
where Z(I) =
K∑
y=1
∏
c∈Cliq(G)
φc([I]c, y).
The potential φc are some non-negative functions. The size of the maximal
cliques reflects the local dependency of the input distribution. A pixel is condi-
tionally independent of all the pixels outside its maximal clique given the values
of other pixels within the clique. We have the kth entry of the softmax prediction
as [f(Ii,j,v)]k = pf (y = k|Ii,j,v), as defined in Eq. (1). Combining it with Eq. (2),
we have:
[f(Ii,j,v)]k ∝
∏
c∈Cliq(G)
φc([Ii,j,v]c, y = k).
In reality, we approximate this graphical model via the CNN f and train it
by maximum likelihood estimation. In a high level, we can decompose f into
two parts. The first part is the convolution block whose each convolutional filter
represents one potential function φc. The second part is a classifier, normally a
multilayer perceptron, that aggregates these φc. For a CNN model that is trained
to model the conditional probability, the activation pattern (the receptive field)
of each of its filters tends to match the corresponding clique structure of the
underlying graphical model. Due to the convolution operators in CNN, given a
pixel (i, j), the larger its associated cliques are, the more filters it will share with
the nearby pixels (nodes) and thus the classifier becomes less sensitive to that
single pixel. As a result, we propose to characterize the cliques structure by mea-
suring how the function hi,jk (v) = [f(Ii,j,v)]k varies within a small neighborhood
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Fig. 6. Illustration of the undirected graphical model where the orange node repre-
sents the label and the blue nodes represent the pixels. The joint probability can be
factored into a product of potentials of the max cliques. For instance, given the two
maximal cliques c1 and c2, where c1 is the subgraph connected by the red edges and
c1 the subgraph connected by green edges, we then have their corresponding potential
functions φc1 and φc2 defined.
of (i, j). Formally, given a distance function induced by some norm || · ||, we can
use ||h(i,j)k || to derive an upper and lower bound of the average pairwise distance
of the functions in the neighborhood of (i, j):∑
p,q
||hpk || − ||hqk || ≤
∑
p,q
||hpk − hqk || ≤
∑
p,q
||hpk ||+ ||hqk ||
where p 6= q are pixels from the neighborhood of (i, j). For simplicity, we choose
the supremum norm || · ||∞ with a discretization of the domain into V values.
We therefore derive our signature Sfk , whose (i, j) entry is ||h(i,j)k ||∞, to reveal
the (local) activation patterns of the CNN model, which in turn, can be used to
indicate the potential Trojan trigger pattern.
5 Experiments
We illustrate the effectiveness and efficiency of one-pixel signature in the back-
doored CNN detection task by evaluating its performance in four datasets:
– MNIST [12]. A standard machine learning dataset which contains 60K
training and 10K testing grayscale images of 10(0-9) hand-written digits.
We select LeNet-5, ResNet-8, or VGG-10 for evaluation.
– fashion-MNIST [26]. The drop-in replacement of MNIST for benchmarking
CNNs, which contains 60K training and 10K testing grayscale images of
10 fashion accessories. We also select LeNet-5, ResNet-8, or VGG-10 for
evaluation.
– GTSRB [21]. German Traffic Sign Recognition (GTSR) Dataset is a commonly-
used colored dataset to evaluate attacks on CNNs. This dataset consists of
39.2K training and 12,6K testing images with 43 different traffic signs. The
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CNN architecture trained on GTSRB consists of 6 convolution layers and 2
dense layers (“6+2 Net”) in line with the set-up of Neural Cleanse [24].
– ImageNet [3]. A widely used large-scale image dataset with more than
14 million colored images of 20,000+ categories. Here we use a subset of
10 classes, where each class has 700 training and 300 testing samples, and
ResNet-50 for comparison to the baseline method Neural Cleanse [24].
Throughout our experiments, we use Adam [10] as the default optimizer.
Same-architecture Detection In this scenario, we train and evaluate the
backdoored CNN detector on CNNs of the same architecture. Specifically, we use
LeNet-5 for MNIST and fashion-MNIST, “6+2 Net” for GTSRB, and ResNet-50
for ImageNet. For each aforementioned architecture and dataset pair, we use the
one-pixel signatures generated from the 300 CNNClean/CNNTrojan for training
and those of another 300 model pairs for testing. For ImageNet we use 100 CNNs
pairs instead of 300 in both training and testing.
Table 2. Backdoored CNN detection/classification rate on classic CNN models trained
on MNIST, fashion-MNIST, GTSRB, and ImageNet dataset in comparison with the
Neural Cleanse [24] algorithm. We also include result for the ABS [16] algorithm on
the GTSRB dataset.
Methods
Datasets
MNIST fashion-MNIST GTSRB ImageNet
Neural Cleanse [24] 60.53% 63.16% 60.71% 54.42%
ABS [16] − − 66.33% −
One-Pixel Signature (ours) 95.72% 94.59% 88.47% 88.69%
As illustrated in Table 2, our method reaches Backdoored CNN detection rate
of approximate 95% for the MNIST and fashion-MNIST dataset, 88% for GT-
SRB dataset, and 89% for ImageNet, significantly outperforming Neural Cleanse
[24] (around 60% on all datasets). The result on GTSRB for ABS is also much
lower than ours.
We observe that the one-pixel signatures layouts of CNNClean and CNNTrojan
are even visually different, namely the one-pixel signatures of CNNTrojan vary
more drastically in pixel values, thus have a greater variance than CNNClean as
shown in Fig. 5.
Cross-architecture Detection In more general and challenging scenarios
where we are not able to narrow down which network architecture is used for the
backdoored CNN model, our approach still achieves relatively high detection rate
on network architectures unseen during training. On MNIST, we train the detec-
tor on signatures generated from 2 out of the 3 network architectures (LeNet-5,
One-Pixel Signature: Characterizing CNN Models for Backdoor Detection 13
Table 3. Backdoored CNN detection/classification rate on classic CNN models trained
on MNIST when the architecture of the testing Backdoored model unknown.
Training Testing Detection Rate(%)
ResNet+VGG LeNet 85.20± 5.85
LeNet+VGG ResNet 76.50± 12.07
LeNet+ResNet VGG 80.00± 3.57
Fig. 7. Detection accuracy on GTSRB w.r.t. the number of training Clean/Backdoored
model pairs in original and seperate channel setting.
ResNet-8, VGG-10) and evaluate the trained detector on CNNs of other archi-
tecture. We observe an average detection rate as high as 80%, reported in Table.
3. In short, our proposed one-pixel signature is architecture-agnostic and the
Backdoored CNN detectors trained on top of it attain great generalizability.
Training with less samples To understand the sample complexity our method,
we investigate the minimum number of training models on four datasets without
heavily downgrading the detection rate. We keep reducing 25 training pairs until
zero and record the average detection rate for 20 detectors trained on the reduced
training set at each time. The curve of the detection rate on GTSRB is shown in
Fig. 7. Intuitively, we need more training models to detect CNNTrojan that is
trained on more complex datasets. Detectors on GTSRB dataset achieve an av-
erage detection rate of 87.31% with a reduced training set of size 175 Clean and
175 Backdoored models, whereas training set with 25 Clean and 25 Backdoored
models is sufficient to train a backdoored CNN detector for models trained on
MNIST to achieve approximately 95% detection rate. For fashion-MNIST, we
need 50 Clean and 50 Backdoored models to achieve the same detection accuracy.
Use channels in one-pixel signature as individual training samples We
could also treat each channel, instead of the whole one-pixel signature, as a pos-
itive/negative sample for training. Thus for models with K classes, the numbers
of training samples increases by K times. We find that thereby training with
only 15 pairs of CNNClean and CNNTrojan models yields the same detection
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rate as training with 300 pairs of models previously. With 100 training pairs, we
could achieve detection rate of 97% in GTSRB and 90% in ImageNet. A detailed
comparison of the detection accuracy on GTSRB between using the individual
channel and the original strategies is shown in Fig. 7 (a).
6 Ablation Study
All-to-one and all-to-all Trojan attack
Our detection technique can be effectively extended to other possible strate-
gies like the all-to-one attack without compromising the detection rate. Under
the scenario of an all-to-one attack, the attacker tries to force the model to clas-
sify all samples implanted with certain backdoor pattern into a targeted class.
We see that the all-to-one attack is a variant of the one-to-one attack, and is
even more likely to be detected by our method.
Similarly, we illustrate the effectiveness of our method on detecting all-to-all
attack. We compare the detection success rate of our Trojan detector to that
of Neural Cleanse and ABS on the testing set of 100 CNN models. It turns out
that our Trojan detector can achieve a detection success rate above 95%, while
both Neural Cleanse and ABS show a poor success rate of around 50%.
Signature generation with different default images Io
One important parameter of our one-pixel signature method is the default
image Io. In our experiments, we empirically set the default image with a con-
stant value of 0. Here we compare three different Io setups: a) a constant value
of 0, as the black image strategy; b) a constant value of 1, as the white image
strategy; c) the pixel-wise mean of testing images, as the average testing image
strategy; We are using a clean leNet-5 model trained on MNIST, and a back-
doored leNet-5 model trained on poisoned MNIST dataset with Trojan trigger
inserted at upper left corner, for evaluation. Both Io = 0 and average image
policy result in high detection rate. Since Io = 0 policy do no require access to
the training set, we regard this as our empirically optimal policy of the default
image.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed a new backdoored CNN detection/classification
method by designing a CNN signature representation that is revealing and easy
to compute. It demonstrates a significant performance improvement over the
existing competing methods with more general assumptions about the Tro-
jan/backdoor attacks.
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